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Abstract
Although many philosophers today have turned away
slightly from the linguistic turn, their methods, e.g. con-
ceptual analysis, are still linguistic. These methods lead
to false results. The right method in philosophy, like in
other disciplines, is to try to perceive the object and to
collect and weigh evidence. We must turn back to things
in themselves.
1 The linguistic turn and the ontic return
There has been a linguistic turn, and there has been an ontic
return, but I shall argue that the ontic return should go much
further. I shall ﬁrst illustrate the kind of philosophical method
which is still prevalent today and which I believe to lead to false
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results. This is the method of conceptual analysis, paraphras-
ing, or of ontological commitment. I call it the linguistic or
the semantic method. To illustrate these methods I shall ﬁrst
present an example where they are at work and show how they
lead to false results: Roderick Chisholm's theory of agent caus-
ation. Contrasting it with these methods I shall then present a
non-linguistic, ontological method for philosophy. After the total
rejection of metaphysics in logical positivism, there were within
the movement of linguistic philosophy some turns towards meta-
physics, in particular Gustav Bergmann's reconstructionism and
Peter Strawson's descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. I shall
criticise these for still being linguistic or conceptual. Finally, I
shall consider Frank Jackson's recent defence of conceptual ana-
lysis and argue that conceptual analysis cannot fulﬁl the task he
ascribes to it. The motto I shall defend in this article is, in the
words of Edmund Husserl, `Zurück zu den Sachen selbst!'
(`Back to things in themselves!'). (Husserl 1901, 7; 1913, 
19, p. 35)
2 The linguistic method, illustrated by
Chisholm's theory of agent causation
We can best understand a philosophical method when we see it
applied to a clear philosophical question. Let us consider Rod-
erick Chisholm's solution of the problem of free will. What is a
free action, and how is it related to the causal processes in and
around the body? If an action is the result of a causal process
which began before the agent even thought about the action, then
we are inclined to say that the action is not free. So one might
think that being the result of a (deterministic or indeterministic)
causal process is not the only way how an event can come about.
(As argued in Wachter 2003 and Wachter 2009a.) Perhaps agents
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bring about some events directly, so that they do not have pre-
ceding causes. Agents can make some events pop up. I call such
events choice events. One might say then that there are two kinds
of causation: `event causation' and `agent causation'. In agent
causation a person is the cause of an event by bringing it about
directly in an action so that it has no preceding cause.
Roderick Chisholm, defending the possibility and existence of
free will, argued that there are two kinds of causation, event
causation and agent causation. By an undertaking he means a
mental event of the type which occurs when a man tries to do
something, regardless of whether he succeeds. Having introduced
the concept of someone undertaking something, Chisholm deﬁnes
the concept of someone contributing causally to something :
S contributes causally at t to p =Df. Either
(a) S does something at t that contributes causally to
p, or
(b) there is a q such that S undertakes q at t and
S-undertaking-q is p, or
(c) there is an r such that S does something at t that
contributes causally to r, and p is that state of aﬀairs
which is S doing something that contributes causally
to r. (Chisholm 1976, p. 205)
So if you raise your arm, you are contributing causally to your
arm's rising. Also, if you try to raise your arm, you are con-
tributing causally to your trying to raise your arm. Thus far
Chisholm's theory seems to be in essence identical to what I said
about agent causation above. Chisholm takes undertakings, such
as your trying to raise your arm, to be events. These events have
the agent as cause. This suggests that Chisholm's undertakings
are what I call choice events.
However, Chisholm's view is diﬀerent. I had described a choice
event as the event through which the action process in a free
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action is initiated. Choice events have no event cause and are
brought about by the agent directly. Chisholm says nothing like
this about undertakings. He does not say that undertakings have
no event cause, and he does not say that they are brought about
by the agent directly. He explicitly allows for the possibility of
an undertaking being the result of a deterministic processes. If,
and only if, an undertaking is not the result of a deterministic
process, according to Chisholm, it is a free undertaking.
Consider the case where an undertaking is the result of a de-
terministic process. Assume your raising your arm was caused by
nothing but earlier events, such as brain states. Surely, contra
Chisholm, there is no reason then to postulate an extra
kind of causation. Surely the full truth is that your arm's rising
was caused by certain preceding events, such as brain events.
There was only event causation involved. In this scenario every
event has an event as cause; it is the result of a causal process.
But Chisholm would still say that there is another kind of caus-
ation than event causation. (Likewise Swinburne 1994, 56-62.)
Chisholm's account is unsatisfying also in another respect. Con-
sider that an undertaking is not the result of a deterministic pro-
cess. Does the undertaking then deserve to be called `free'? I do
not think so. The trouble with Chisholm's account of free action
is that it fails to entail that the agent has control over which
undertaking occurs. The idea behind Chisholm's deﬁnition that
an undertaking is free if and only if it is not the result of a de-
terministic process, may be that if the undertaking is not the
result of a deterministic process then it is up to the agent. But
this does not follow. An undertaking that is not the result
of a deterministic process could be a matter of chance,
i.e. it could be the result of an indeterministic process.
In that case the agent would not have any more control
over its occurrence than in the case where it is the result
of a deterministic process. One might want to reply that an
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undertaking is not the sort of thing which can occur by chance,
but this reply is hardly available to Chisholm. As becomes clear
in his deﬁnition of a free undertaking as one which is not the res-
ult of a deterministic process, he allows for the possibility of an
undertaking which is the result of a deterministic process. And
if undertakings are the sort of things which can be the result of
deterministic processes, then there is no reason to think that they
cannot occur by chance, i.e. be the result of an indeterministic
process.
Chisholm is wrong when he postulates that unfree actions in-
volve agent causation as a kind of causation diﬀerent from event
causation, and in his account of free action his account of agent
causation is too weak. His characterisation of agent causation
fails to entail that the agent has control over the undertaking. I
am discussing this here in order to explain why Chisholm comes
to such false conclusions. He is using a linguistic method.
He writes:
The philosophical question is not  or at least it shouldn't
be  the question whether or not there is `agent caus-
ation'. The philosophical question should be, rather,
the question whether `agent causation' is reducible to
`event causation'. Thus, for example, if we have good
reason for believing that Jones did kill his uncle, then
the philosophical question about Jones as cause would
be: Can we express the statement `Jones killed
his uncle' without loss of meaning into a set of
statements in which only events are said to be
causes and in which Jones himself is not said to
be the source of any activity? And can we do this
without being left with any residue of agent causation
 that is, without being left with some such statement
as `Jones raised his arm' wherein Jones once again
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plays the role of cause or partial cause of a certain
event? (Chisholm 1978, 622f, quoted in O'Connor
2000, 64, my emph.)
Chisholm's claim that there is agent causation is not really a
claim about action but about certain statements describing ac-
tions. It is a child of the linguistic turn. Chisholm's reason
for saying that also unfree actions involve agent causation is not
that he believes that there is a special kind of causation involved,
namely bringing about by choice, and that agents can initiate
causal processes. His reason is rather that the statement `Jones
killed his uncle' cannot be transformed into a statement in which
`only events are said to be causes and in which Jones himself is
not said to be the source of any activity' (cf. Chisholm 1976,
199). By saying that `There are two kinds of causation:
event causation and agent causation' or `There is irredu-
cible agent causation' Chisholm means that `John killed
his uncle' cannot be transformed into non-agent talk.
We shall see below that this kind of new-speak was introduced
by Gustav Bergmann (1953). I see no good reason for using
these sentences in this sense. They are less misleadingly used for
claiming that there is besides event causation another way how
an event can come about.
Moreover, investigating statements in this way is the wrong
method for ﬁnding out whether there is agent causation. That
the statement `John killed his uncle' cannot be transformed into
a statement of a diﬀerent type does neither mean nor entail that
John's action involved a kind of causation diﬀerent from event
causation. Chisholm's mistake is that he tries to answer a meta-
physical question just by answering semantic questions.
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3 The non-linguistic, non-semantic,
ontological method
3.1 Existence questions
By contrast with Chisholm's method, let me sketch an alternative
philosophical method, one which uses much less conceptual, lin-
guistic, or semantic analysis. It has the aim to produce true de-
scriptions of what there is, and analysing concepts is neither a
method for this nor a central aim in itself. Sometimes philosophy
has to address existence questions, because some existence ques-
tions are philosophical, and sometimes existence questions arise
in philosophy. Examples are `Is there agent causation?', `Are
there universals?', `Is there a God?', `Does the past or the future
exist, or only what is present?', `Are there objective duties?', `Are
there possible worlds?', `Do we have a soul?', or `Are there causal
connections?' Some of these may be unclear or meaningless or
may have no true answer, but there surely are some philosoph-
ical existence questions. Against the assumption that they are to
be answered by some linguistic method, such as conceptual ana-
lysis, ontological commitment, or paraphrasing or reconstruction
statements, I suggest that for philosophical existence questions
the same method is to be used than for other existence questions:
try to perceive the thing and collect and weigh evidence
for and against its existence.
3.2 Deﬁning the subject term of an existence question
Before we can ﬁnd the answer to an existence question, we have
to deﬁne, spell out, or develop the subject concept. We have to
deﬁne what we are looking for. Here some kind of conceptual
analysis indeed has its place in philosophy. Examine how the
term, e.g. `free action', is used usually. Deﬁne the meaning of
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the term in accordance with this, or make clear that you use it
diﬀerently. If the term is used with various meanings or only with
an unclear meaning, deﬁne the one for which you want to pursue
the existence question. If the term is a technical term and is thus
not taken from ordinary language or is used diﬀerently than in
ordinary language, then that meaning has to be deﬁned.
Often we have to construe a concept. For example, the ordin-
ary concept `free' is not detailed and precise enough for a philo-
sophical investigation and the word is used diﬀerently on diﬀerent
occasions. To investigate whether we have free will, we ﬁrst have
to develop a more detailed description of what free actions would
be like. (Like the one I sketched above.) On the basis of this
we can then spell out what would constitute evidence for the ex-
istence of free actions. Only then we can investigate properly
whether there are free actions.
Often several concepts can be distinguished. The existence
question then has to be addressed for each of them. For example,
you can distinguish, spell out, and deﬁne (a) what compatibilists
call a free action, (b) an action which is the result of an inde-
terministic process, and (c) an action where the agent initiates
a causal process. For each of these conceptions then one ques-
tion is whether the term `free' is used adequately for this, and
another question is whether there exists something falling under
the concept.
In my view these activities involve not just the analysis of
concepts but describing possible things and insight into modal
connections, which are not somehow residing in the concept and
which you do not see by looking just at the concept. The phe-
nomenologists called this `Wesensschau' (Reinach 1913). But
even if that is true, answering existence questions requires deﬁn-
ing the concept in question. So analysing or developing concepts
is a part of the right method for answering existence questions in
philosophy or elsewhere.
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If the subject concept of an existence claim is deﬁned properly,
then we have an idea of the diﬀerence between a world with the
things in question and a world without such things. If it is deﬁned
what we are looking for, then we also know whether we would
ﬁnd the thing by investigating language or concepts, or whether
we have to look elsewhere. If `agent causation' in `Is there agent
causation?' is deﬁned properly, then it is deﬁned whether we ﬁnd
the answer by examining whether statements of one type can be
translated into sentences of a certain other type. The answer
can only be found in this way if `agent causation' is a kind of
concept or statement. Perhaps some philosophers disagree with
this because they really believe that we can ﬁnd whether agents
can initiate causal processes by investigating statements and con-
cepts. At any rate, it has to be clariﬁed whether the question is
one about concepts or statements or about other things, for ex-
ample the things falling under the concept. Questions must not
be phrased so that they sound as if they are about things in them-
selves if they are meant to be only about language and concepts.
If a question is about statements and concepts, then it should be
phrased so that this becomes clear. If the question is whether
we can express a statement like `Jones killed his uncle' without
loss of meaning into a set of statements in which only events are
said to be causes, then it should be phrased thus, and not as `Is
there agent causation?' or `Is agent causation reducible to event
causation?'. It may turn out for some questions then that there
is no true answer for them or that they are uninteresting.
In my view, in `analytic metaphysics' today many questions for
which much ink is consumed are unclear in this respect. They
have no true answer, or only one in terms of how certain words are
used. They are, as Carnap (1928) called certain other questions,
`Scheinprobleme', pseudoproblems. I cannot demonstrate this
here but only want to suggest the following rule. If we raise or
address a question in philosophy, we should always ask:
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Is there a true answer to this question to be discovered?
Is the only answer to this question one about how we use
certain words?
3.3 Trying to perceive the thing
When we have deﬁned the subject term of the existence question,
then we can start to look for the answer. What I am denying
here is that existence questions in philosophy are to be answered
solely through conceptual analysis or paraphrasing statements.
As in other areas too, in philosophy existence questions are to
be answered by trying to perceive the thing or by collecting and
weighing evidence. If you are not an empiricist, then you will not
exclude in principle experience or perception other than sense
perception. Perhaps there is perception other than sense percep-
tion but it supports only synthetic modal claims and no existen-
tial claims. But perhaps there is non-sensual perception support-
ing existence claims too, for example perceptual experiences of
God (Swinburne 2004, ch. 13) or intuitions about moral duties
(Huemer 2006).
The assumption here is not that one can know something about
the world without any experience at all, but that there are other
kinds of experience  in the sense of epistemic contact with the
world  than sense experience. Max Scheler therefore used the
term `phenomenological experience' or `a priori experience'. (Scheler
1916, 68-71) I suggest that one should not exclude any kind of
perception at this point. If there is no perception other than
sense perception, then empiricism is true. But its truth should
not be presupposed when addressing an existence question.
By claiming that philosophical existence questions are to be
answered, like others too, by trying to perceive the thing and
by weighing evidence, I am objecting to the view that philosophy
makes no claims about the world but only about language or con-
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cepts and to the view that philosophy does not use evidence. An
example of the latter view is Gustav Bergmann's: `no philosoph-
ical question worthy of the name is ever settled by experimental
or, for that matter, experiential evidence. Things are what they
are. In some sense philosophy is, therefore, verbal or linguistic.'1
So Bergmann postulates that philosophy cannot or must not use
any experience. This is wrong if there are questions about the
world which are philosophical and to whose answer philosophy
can contribute. It may be that for some philosophical questions
other disciplines can contribute too to answering them. Presum-
ably neuroscience and experimental psychology can conduct some
experiments which contribute to answering the question whether
we have free will. But besides the task of spelling out and deﬁning
what a free action would be, philosophy has the task, for example,
to evaluate our inner experience of freedom. More obvious still is
that philosophy can investigate, considering also experience and
evidence, whether there are objective moral duties, whether we
have a soul, and whether there is a God.
3.4 Weighing evidence
By `evidence' here I mean neither, as Edmund Husserl and Franz
von Brentano meant by the German word `Evidenz', introspec-
tion leading to absolute certainty, nor sense experience. I also do
not only mean experiments, but experiments are a kind of evid-
ence. By evidence I mean something which makes the hypothesis
more probable. As Brown's ﬁngerprints on the safe are evidence
for Brown's being the thief or as the universe's having a begin-
ning is evidence for the existence of God. To ask for evidence for
1Bergmann 1953,  2, p. 149. The opposite view is expressed by Donald
C. Williams: `Metaphysics is the thoroughly empirical science. Every item of
experience must be an exemplar and test case for the categories of analytical
ontology.' (1953, 3)
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the existence of X is to ask whether things look as if there are
Xs. Do things look more as we should expect them to look on
the assumption that there are Xs than as we should expect them
to look on the assumption that there are no Xs? Do some of the
other things we know indicate that there are Xs? E is evidence
for H if, and only if, E is more probable on the assumption that
H than on the assumption that not-H. Presumably this is only
the case if H provides an explanation for E, be it a causal one
or some other kind of explanation (as discussed in Swoyer 1999).
For example, the ﬁne-tuning of the universe is evidence for the
existence of God because on the assumption that there is no God
the ﬁne-tuning is very improbable and on the assumption that
there is a God it is more probable because God could cause a
ﬁne-tuned Big Bang and has reason to do so. The method of
weighing evidence in order to answer a metaphysical existence
question has been spelled out in detail by (Swinburne 2004, chs.
1-4) discussing the question whether there is a God.
To illustrate this, let us apply this to a metaphysical ques-
tion, namely `Are there causal connections?'. To say that there
are no causal connections is to say that the universe is as David
Lewis's view of `Humean Supervenience' has it: `all there is to the
world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one
little thing and then another.' (Lewis 1986, ix) Nothing pushes
or brings about something else. One item of evidence for the
existence of causal connections is the order in the universe and
predictability of many events. We can predict so many events:
earth quakes, the movement of a billiard ball after being pushed
by another one, eclipses, and the movement of planets. On the
assumption that there are no causal connections we should ex-
pect that we cannot predict anything. Anything would be equally
likely to follow anything. A billiard ball would be equally likely
to carry on rolling or to stop or to vanish completely. The ex-
istence of causal connections can, if combined with certain other
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assumptions, explain the predictability of many events. Inbuilt
into states of the universe is a tendency to carry on in a certain
way so that one event may lead to a certain later event and the
latter can be predicted if one knows about the former and knows
what sort of tendencies there are in such situations and thus that
events of this kind lead to events of the latter kind if nothing
intervenes. (As I have argued in (Wachter 2009b) and (Wachter
2009a).)
Hume failed to consider whether the predictability of many
events is evidence for the existence of causal connections. The
Arabic philosopher Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) also denied the exist-
ence of causal connections, but he did consider it and oﬀered an
alternative explanation: God brings about every event directly,
and does so in a predictable way because he likes order and be-
cause he wants the universe to be predictable for us. That it at
least more plausible than the Humean view which leaves predict-
ability entirely unexplained.
The assumption of causal connections could be supported not
only by evidence but also by perceptions. When you hold an
apple in you hand you feel it being drawn downwards. This one
can take to be a perceptual experience of a causal connection of
a certain type.
This method of investigating whether there are causal connec-
tions is very diﬀerent from the methods usually used today, which
are still linguistic. Following a linguistic method, causal state-
ments are paraphrased and reductive deﬁnitions of `cause' are de-
veloped which do not mention any bringing about any more and
which are therefore somehow taken to support the view that there
are no causal connections. Already David Hume's developed a
reductive concept of causation and then apparently took this to
support the view that there are no causal connections (although
Galen Strawson (1989) has argued that Hume did not really deny
the existence of causal connections). The step from having de-
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veloped a reductive deﬁnition of `cause' (and an account of the
origin of the concept) to the conclusion that there are no causal
connections is wrong. Instead, the right method is to try to
perceive causal connections and, after spelling out what causal
connections could be like, to collect and weigh the evidence.
3.5 Describing actual and possible things and
scenarios
Answering existence questions is of course not the only task of
philosophy. In particular there are two further big tasks: 1. De-
scribing actual and possible things and scenarios; 2. answer-
ing questions about synthetic modal truths, such as `Can one be
guilty for something one did not do freely?'. Let me comment
brieﬂy on both.
That philosophy has the task of describing is not uncontrover-
sial. Positivists, for example, would say that only the natural
sciences and history describe things and that philosophy only
analyses language or concepts. Against this I suggest that there
are things which natural scientists are not trained to describe.
Concerning causation, for example, philosophy has the task to de-
scribe causation. Not only describe the concept of causation but
causation. Not only describe the content of the concept `cause'
but the object. Describe what is there or what is going in cases
about which we truly say that one event caused another. Of
course, philosophy can and needs to describe only certain aspects
of this, but still the aim is to describe. For this the philosopher
has to look at the things in themselves, not only at thoughts,
language, concepts, or texts. A good philosopher is only one
who is good at looking at and describing the things and not only
sophisticated and clever in analysing and shuing statements.
Besides describing actual things, philosophy has the task to de-
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scribe possible things.2 For example, philosophy should not only
try to describe our actions as they are but also describe what
kind of actions or agents would be possible, for example perfectly
free agents, agents with limited free will, and non-rational free
agents. This can then be followed by an investigation about the
existence of such things as described above.
3.6 Synthetic modal truths
Describing possible things leads to the task of answering modal
questions. Many assume that we ﬁnd the answers to modal ques-
tions by investigating concepts. This view is an inheritance from
logical positivism. In its original form this doctrine claimed that
synthetic statements are contingent and analytic statements are
necessary and reﬂect only the rules for using the words. (Schlick
1930a) (Ayer 1936) I have defended elsewhere (Wachter 2009c
and 2009a, ch. 3) the contrary view that modal questions are to
be answered by synthetic modal statements. Therefore also with
regard to this task, in the philosophical method proposed here I
suggest to turn away from language back to things in themselves.
Modal questions arise because with the predicates we have we can
form descriptions of things arbitrarily. But some of these descrip-
tions might not describe something possible. For every two pre-
dicates, `A' and `B', (which are not deﬁned in terms of each other)
the question arises whether the existence of something which is A
and B is possible. There is no good reason for presuming that all
properties, i.e. the objects of predicates, are combinable. `There
2 The Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden attributed to `ontology'
the task of investigating what is possible and investigating `forms', e.g. the
form of a substance and thus what it would be to be a substance, and to
`metaphysics' the task of investigating what actually exists. (Ingarden 1964,
 5-6) This usage of `ontology' and `metaphysics' is too unusual to be prac-
tical, but it illustrates well the diﬀerence between these tasks.
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is something that is A and B' may be consistent, i.e. without
contradiction, but describe something impossible. Then this is a
synthetic modal truth: `It is impossible that there is something
which is A and B'. Even if all properties were combinable, there
would be synthetic modal truths, for example `All properties are
combinable', or for example `It is possible that there is something
which is A and B'. We must distinguish clearly being consist-
ent from being possible, and being analytic from being necessary.
Whether a statement is consistent we know through investigating
concepts and words, but modal truths we know through modal
intuitions. As modal truths are about the world, modal intuition
is a way of looking at things in themselves.
4 The linguistic turn and some attempts to
turn back to things in themselves
4.1 Gustav Bergmann's reconstructionism
In the beginning, the philosophers of the linguistic turn claimed
that all metaphysical questions are meaningless (Carnap 1932)
and that problems of metaphysics are pseudoproblems (Carnap
1928). This includes questions about free will (Schlick 1930b),
God (Carnap 1929; Ayer 1936, ch. 6), the soul, and `all philo-
sophy of value and normative theory' (Carnap 1932, 61). Among
the logical positivists, however, there were also some who did
not say that metaphysics is meaningless or impossible. The re-
constructionists, led by Gustav Bergmann, wanted to `reconstruct
[. . . ] the old metaphysics' `in the new style' (1953, 147). They en-
tirely agreed with the other positivists that the old metaphysical
questions are meaningless. They too wanted to be philosophers
through language and philosophize by means of language. (1953,
146) But Bergmann believed that one can `philosophize [. . . ]
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about he world' `by means of language'. (1960, 602) For him,
philosophical discourse is `ordinary or [. . . ] commonsensical dis-
course about an ideal language' (1953, 151). An `ideal language'
is `a schema rather than a language actually be spoken' (1950,
84). But why should discourse about this ideal language help
us to ﬁnd out something about the world? Because, Bergmann
believes, the categorial features of the world reﬂect them-
selves in the structural properties of the ideal language.
The ideal language `is a picture of the world' (1960, 608).
Here is an example of such a reconstruction: `Consider the
thesis of classical nominalism that there are no universals. Given
the linguistic turn it becomes the assertion that the ideal language
contains no undeﬁned descriptive signs except proper names.'
(Bergmann 1953, 155) Bergmann ﬁnds the old question `Are there
universals?' meaningless but nevertheless ﬁnds it wrong `to dis-
miss it out of hand, as some positivists unfortunately do' (157).
He thinks that there is a real question which can also be ex-
pressed by `Are there universals?', namely the question `Does the
ideal language contain undeﬁned descriptive signs except proper
names?'.
My ﬁrst comment on this is that if a question is replaced by
another one, this has to be made explicit. If the question is
`Does the ideal language contain undeﬁned descriptive signs ex-
cept proper names?' it should be expressed with these words and
not with `Are there universals?'. If the question is phrased as
`Are there universals?' then `universals' has to be deﬁned so that
it is clear whether they are, like electrons and rabbits, something
that would exist even if there were no language.
Secondly, in either case, if the question is about `the categorial
features of the world' (1950, 84) or if it is about language, one
has to be critical whether there is a true answer to it. If it is
about language-independent universals, the possibility has to be
considered that there is no structure of the world parallel to the
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subject-predicate structure of our language. If it is about lan-
guage, then it has to be examined whether there is such a thing
as an `ideal language' which can be investigated and about which
the truth in question can be discovered.
Thirdly, is the ideal language derived from our language? If
it is not derived from our language, then it has to be construed.
But in order to construe it so that, as Bergmann assumes, `it
is a picture of the world' (1960, 608) and reﬂects `the categorial
features of the world' (1950, 84), one ﬁrst needs knowledge about
these features of the world. But then the investigation of the ideal
language is no method to discover the structure of the world. If,
however, the ideal language is derived from our language, then
the question arises whether and why our language reﬂects the
categorial structure of the world. Why should the `structural
properties' of our language be parallel to the most basic
structure of the world? (1950, 84) We would need reasons for
this assumption. In either case, contrary to Bergmann's postulate
that philosophy must not use experience or evidence, we need
evidence concerning the structure of the world. Either evidence
in order to discover the structure of the world in order to be able
to construe an ideal language, or evidence for the assumption
that the structures of our language are parallel to the most basic
structure of the world.
4.2 Peter Strawson's distinction between descriptive
and revisionary metaphysics
Peter Strawson's book Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Meta-
physics (1959) made it acceptable again in Oxford to confess to
do metaphysics. But Strawson was still a linguistic philosopher.
However, he introduced also, for a project which he himself did
not want to pursue, the notion `revisionary metaphysics', which
many take to designate an alternative to linguistic metaphysics.
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`Descriptive metaphysics', which Strawson himself pursued, `de-
scribes the structure of our thought about the world' (1959, 9).
This is a linguistic project with a certain Kantian ﬂavour. The
alternative to this, one should think, is to describe the world. But
not so for Strawson. Also `revisionary metaphysics', as Strawson
deﬁnes it, remains within the paradigm of the linguistic turn.
Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the ac-
tual structure of our thought about the world, revi-
sionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better
structure. (Strawson 1959, 9)
Revisionary metaphysics tries to produce a better struc-
ture of our thought about the world, so it is still con-
cerned only with language, concepts, and thought! It is
not concerned with things in themselves. This illustrates that the
linguistic turn was not only widespread, but that the alternative
is even forgotten. As neither `descriptive metaphysics' nor `re-
visionary metaphysics', because of Strawson's deﬁnition, is suit-
able, we even do not have a handy name for it. `Non-linguistic
philosophy', `empirical metaphysics', or `ontological metaphys-
ics' can be used, but more suitable would be to use just `meta-
physics' and `ontology' and to call the reconstructionist project
`semantics', `philosophical logic', or `semantology'.
5 Frank Jackson's `entry by entailment'
thesis
Frank Jackson has oﬀered a clear explication and defence of a
linguistic method in his book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A De-
fence of Conceptual Analysis (2000). Let us consider his method
to examine physicalism. He deﬁnes physicalism not simply as
the claim that there is nothing non-physical, because he takes
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the task of metaphysics not to be drawing up lists of what exists
(p. 4). Instead he deﬁnes it in terms of a certain description of
the world being in a certain sense complete.
Physicalism is rather the claim that if you duplic-
ate our world in all physical respects and stop right
there, you duplicate it in all respects; it says that
[. . . :] Any world which is a minimal physical duplic-
ate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world
[. . . ] where a minimal physical duplicate is what you
get if you `stop right there.' (Jackson 2000, 12)
Let us call this the ﬁxing thesis or the supervenience thesis.
It does not rule out the mere possibility of non-physical things
(p. 11f), but it claims that the psychological events which ex-
ist are nothing over and above the physical. The idea behind
the supervenience thesis is that if physicalism is true, then the
mental, whose existence cannot be denied, is in some sense a sur-
face phenomenon whose basis are the brain events, comparable
perhaps to how liquidity is a surface phenomenon whose basis
are the molecules and the forces between them, or comparable to
the actions of a computer program, whose basis are the micro-
physical events. In some sense it is true to say that the actions
of the computer program are nothing over and above the events
at the micro level. If the mental is a surface phenomenon, then
whenever particles are arranged in a certain (very complicated)
way, mental phenomena arise. So the physical ﬁxes the mental.
This is expressed in Jackson's deﬁnition of physicalism. This way
he can formulate an alternative to simply saying `There is noth-
ing non-physical' or `There is something non-physical'. He avoids
saying that there is nothing mental, which is obviously false, by
saying that the physical is in a certain sense more fundamental.3
3In my view, the supervenience thesis is not suﬃcient for physicalism.
Maybe the supervenience thesis is true but wherever there are psychological
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Jacksons central thesis in his defence of conceptual analysis is
the `entry by entailment' thesis:
The one and only way of having a place in an account
told in some set of preferred terms is by being entailed
by that account. (Jackson 2000, 5)
The physicalist holds that a description of the world in physical
terms entails a description of everything psychological. Thus the
description in physical terms is `a complete story about the nature
of our world' (9). `The world is entirely physical in nature, [. . . ]
it is nothing but, or nothing over and above, the physical world,
[. . . ] and a full inventory of the instantiated physical properties
and relations would be a full inventory simpliciter.'
Jackson clariﬁes that by `A entails B' here he does not mean
that B can be derived from A by thinking alone, a priori. He
means `the necessary truth-preserving notion  call it necessary
determination or ﬁxing if you prefer' (25). That the physical
entails the mental only means that it is impossible that there
exists a perfect copy of your body which does not give rise to a
mental life as you have it.
What has this to do with conceptual analysis? Jacksons claims
that conceptual analysis is the method to examine physicalism
because
conceptual analysis is the very business of addressing
when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is
events there is some non-physical stuﬀ involved. Maybe it is forced into
being by the physical. In that case the physical would ﬁx the psychological,
but there would be non-physical things. In other areas there are yet more
plausible cases where B is ﬁxed through A but B is something over and above
A. Maybe it is impossible that God would not create a universe and that,
because this world is the best possible world, He would create a diﬀerent
universe. In that case the universe would supervene on God but nevertheless
clearly would be something over and above God.
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made true by one told in some allegedly more funda-
mental vocabulary. (Jackson 2000, 28)
Jackson defends this by pointing out that conceptual analysis
uses `intuitions about possible cases' (31) in order to determine
when certain words are applied to something. In order to know
whether Ks are nothing over and above Js, we need `some concep-
tion of what counts as a K, and what counts as a J' (31). He says
himself that he is attributing only a `modest role' to conceptual
analysis:
The role is that of addressing the question of what
to say about matters described in one set of terms
given a story about matters in another set of terms.
Conceptual analysis is not being given a role in de-
termining the fundamental nature of our world; it is,
rather being given a central role in determining what
to say in less fundamental terms given an account of
the world stated in more fundamental terms. (Jack-
son 2000, 44)
Let me point out that according to what Jackson says this is
a limited role, and that it is in fact even more limited than he
thinks.
First, it is of course true that for investigating a thesis like
physicalism we need to know how physical terms and how psy-
chological terms are used. But this is a long way from ﬁnding
out whether the physical necessitates the psychological. Jackson
seems to assume that modal truths are known through conceptual
investigations. This presupposes the positivist view that modal
truths are about how words are used, about `what counts as a K,
and what counts as a J' (31). I agree that to ﬁnd out this is a mat-
ter of what may well be called conceptual analysis. You can ﬁnd
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out by conceptual analysis that a married man does not count
as a bachelor, that by calling something knowledge one claims
that it is true but does not claim that it is infallible, and that
only something which has the same micro-structure as our water
counts as water. Positivism taught that modal truths are about
this and that there are no other modal truths. Positivism claimed
this, against the phenomenologists, because other modal truths
would be about the world and perhaps would be known in other
ways than through sense experience, and positivism wanted to
rescue the doctrine that there is no knowledge about the world
which does not come through sense experience. I have argued
elsewhere that logical positivism led us to misunderstand modal
claims and that modal truths are found neither by investigat-
ing `what counts as a K' nor by investigating which statements
are self-contradictory. (Wachter 2009a,c) Let me here just try
to make plausible the claim that whether the physical necessit-
ates the psychological cannot be found out through conceptual
analysis.
In brief: even if the psychological description of the world could
be derived a priori, through thinking alone, from the physical
description, this would not be a matter of what counts as a K
and thus it would not be know through conceptual analysis. As
it in fact cannot be derived through thinking alone, it is even
clearer that it cannot be known through conceptual analysis. Let
me illustrate this with an example of an a priori derivation:
From (G) `Brown has guilt for having killed Smith' we can
derive in some sense by thinking alone (F) `Brown killed Smith
freely' because we have a clear modal intuition that one cannot
be guilty for something one did not do freely. I believe that
this modal truth is synthetic. It is not contradictory to say that
`Brown was determined to kill Smith' and `Brown has guild for
having killed Smith'. The concept of being free is not a part
of the concept of being guilty. The concept of a bachelor, for
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example, is a composed concept: it is composed of being a man
and being unmarried. By contrast, the concept of being guilty
is not a composed concept. If being free were a part of it, then
we would have a concept which is just like the concept of being
guilty except that it is neutral about being free. This would be
the other component of the composed concept. We would have
an idea of somebody such that the only reason why it is not true
to say that he is guilty is that he was not free. But we have
no such concept, because such a thing seems impossible to us. If
you take away being unmarried from being a bachelor, something
possible remains: a man. But from being guilty you cannot take
away being free. Therefore I suggest that for deriving (F) from
(G) one needs to know more than what counts as being guilty.
It is misleading to say that the derivation can be made through
conceptual analysis because this suggests that (F) and (G) are
linked through a deﬁnition, as `being unmarried' and `being a
man' is linked in the concept `bachelor'.
Likewise, even if the psychological description of the world
could be derived through thinking alone from the physical de-
scription, this would not be discovered by conceptual analysis
alone. Conceptual analysis discovers the rules for applying phys-
ical and psychological terms. It discovers to what kind of objects
we apply which terms, but if certain psychological terms necessar-
ily applied to everything to which certain physical terms applied,
this would be a fact over and above the rules of language. A
word is linked by a rule of language to a concept, under which
the things fall to which the word applies. But if `Nothing can be
A without being B' is true, then this is not a rule of language
but a fact about the things over and above the rules which link
`A' and `B' to certain concepts. It is a (synthetic) modal fact. (If
`There can be something that is A and B' were true, this would
be a synthetic modal truth too.) That `jealousy' applies to people
with a certain state of mind is a rule of language. That `brain
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state so-and-so' applies to a certain kind of brain state is also a
rule of language. But if it is impossible that there is a man to
whom `has brain state so-and-so' but not `is jealous' applies, then
this is not itself a rule of language and it does not follow from
the rules of language. It is a about the objects of the words. It
is a modal connection. It is not a mere matter of what counts as
a K, and what counts as a J, and therefore cannot be discovered
by conceptual analysis alone.
As the psychological description of the world cannot be de-
rived from the physical description by thinking alone, this is even
clearer. As many have argued,4 from no description of you in
physical terms one can derive by thinking alone what you think
and feel. I agree with Jackson that this does not defeat physic-
alism. (Wachter 2009d) But if the physical did ﬁx the mental,
this could not be know through thinking alone and not through
knowing all rules of language and thus not through `conceptual
analysis' in any adequate sense.
Jackson, however, claims that the physicalist `is committed to
the in principle deducibility of the psychological from the phys-
ical' (83). This claims becomes less surprising if we understand
what he means. He considers these three statements:
(2) H2O covers most of the Earth;
4For example, Richard Swinburne writes: `No description of the public
physical world entails that when you shine a certain light, I will have a blue
image; or when you prick me with a needle, I will feel pain' (Swinburne
1997, 315). John Searle writes: `No description of the third-person, object-
ive, physiological facts would convey the subjective, ﬁrst-person character of
pain, simply because the ﬁrst-person features are diﬀerent from the third-
person features' (Searle 1992, 117). David Chalmers makes the same point
by arguing that there is no contradiction in the description of a zombie: there
is no contradiction in the description of the situation where there is besides
me `someone or something physically identical to me (or to any other con-
scious being), but lacking conscious experiences altogether' (Chalmers 1996,
94).
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(2a) H2O is the watery stuﬀ of our acquaintance;
(3) Therefore, water covers most of the Earth. (Jack-
son 2000, 82)
Jackson admits that `the passage from (2) to (3) is a posteriori'
(82). He just means that `the passage from (2) together with (2a)
to (3) is a priori'. That is true, but not what philosophers usually
mean when they say that psychological descriptions are a priori
derivable from physical descriptions. Of course, from physical
descriptions together with statements of identity between mental
events and physical events psychological descriptions would be
derivable a priori, but the question is whether they are derivable
without such identity statements or whether such identity state-
ments, or statements claiming that certain physical events give
rise to certain psychological events, can be derived.
Physicalism can only being defended by defending such state-
ments. A ﬁrst step towards defending physicalism would be to
argue that from what we know about psychological events and
what we know about physical events, we cannot rule out that
such statements are true. A second step would be to provide
evidence for the truth of such statements. Their truth cannot
be discovered by conceptual analysis alone, i.e. by investigating
`what counts as a K, and what counts as a J'. To discover them
we would have to look at things in themselves.
I conclude that Jackson has not shown that conceptual ana-
lysis can discover the truth of supervenience claims and thus is a
central method of philosophy. All conceptual analysis can reveal
is `what counts as a K, and what counts as a J'. That is very im-
portant in philosophy. For example, it can reveal that the term
`know' is used in order to say about a statement, among other
things, that it is true and that, as Gettier has shown, the person
had some contact with the object. But for most philosophical
26
questions we need more or other methods. Conceptual analysis
cannot discover what exists, cannot discover what is possible, and
cannot produce true descriptions of the objects of philosophical
research. For this we need to turn back to things in themselves.
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